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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay addresses an anomaly in the law‘s protection of property 
ownership.  Ex ante, the owner‘s right to exclude others from her property 
receives the highest degree of protection.  An owner who anticipates an un-
authorized entry by a third party can secure an injunction against that per-
son.  The same is true of an owner who discovers an ongoing intrusion.  In 
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this case, a court will order the trespasser to vacate immediately, thereby 
restoring the owner‘s ―sole and despotic dominion‖ over her property.1  
The protection owners enjoy ex ante is an example of what Guido Ca-
labresi and Douglas Melamed famously termed property rule protection.2  
Under the Calabresi–Melamedian definition, property rule protection gives 
an entitlement holder the right to set the price for the use of her entitlement.  
More generally, it empowers the entitlement holder to transact with others 
on her own terms.  Therefore, property rule protection also provides im-
munity against forced transactions.  The point and purpose of this protec-
tion is to discourage third parties from attempting to circumvent market 
transactions and encourage them to negotiate with the rights holders.  Ac-
cordingly, a person interested in using another‘s private property must ei-
ther transact on the owner‘s terms or forego his plan. 
Ex post, however, things change dramatically.  After a trespass ends, 
the typical remedy an aggrieved owner can receive in court is compensation 
measured by the market value of the unauthorized use.  Courts ordinarily 
set the compensation amount equal to the rent that owners of similar prop-
erties can obtain on the market.3  This measure applies to all trespass cases 
except the most egregious ones, where courts are authorized to grant puni-
tive damages.4  Ex post, therefore, the owner must suffice herself with less-
er protection than she originally had, namely, market-value compensation.  
Under current law, the trespasser effectively holds a call option on the own-
er‘s property.5  By trespassing, he can impose a market-price rental transac-
tion on the owner.  In Calabresi and Melamed‘s terminology, the protection 
 
 
 
1
  See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  For an influential discussion of the Blacksto-
nian view‘s effect on contemporary theories of property rights, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–64 (2001) [herei-
nafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened?].  For discussions of the limits of the right to exclude, see 
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 439–80 (2007); Jo-
seph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1283, 1286–1412, 1450–77 (1996) (analyzing antidiscriminatory and other limitations to the right to ex-
clude).  See also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (famously holding on policy grounds that a 
farm owner cannot deny a worker living on the farm an opportunity to receive aid from volunteers). 
2
  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
3
  See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 cmt. b (1979) (stating that common law courts 
predominantly use market-based rent as a benchmark for determining property owners‘ compensation 
for trespass); DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION, § 5.12(1) at 
827–29 (2d ed. 1993) (attesting that, except in special cases, ―[g]eneral damages recoveries for harm to 
interests in land are usually based on the diminished market value or diminished rental value of land‖ 
and summarizing relevant caselaw).  For a recent court decision applying the market-priced rent crite-
rion, see Franco v. Piccilo, 853 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (instructing the court below to 
assess plaintiff‘s compensation for trespassory parking of vehicles on his driveway based on a ―reasona-
ble rental value‖). 
4
  See infra Part III. 
5
  See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998) (importing the tax-
onomy of ―call‖ and ―put‖ options to explain the protections of liability and property rules). 
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afforded to owners ex post is an example of liability rule protection.  This 
category includes all cases in which an entitlement owner does not get to set 
the price for the use of the entitlement and instead a state actor, such as a 
court, an administrative agency, or the legislature sets the price.   
The switch from an injunctive remedy, ex ante, to compensatory relief, 
ex post, should not trouble us in and of itself.  After all, once a violation of 
a right ends, money damages are the only means of redressing the violation.  
What is troubling is the choice of market value as the measure of the own-
er‘s compensation.  Indeed, from the vantage point of property theorists, it 
presents an anomaly.  
To see why, it is necessary to understand the impact of the weakened 
ex post protection on the ex ante protection of the owner against trespass.  
Setting compensation at market value effectively erases the power of the 
owner to determine the price for the use of her entitlement.  Similarly, it 
annuls the owner‘s immunity against forced transactions.  Worse yet, it un-
dermines the incentive for third parties to initiate negotiations with property 
owners.  Why would third parties even attempt to negotiate with owners 
and risk a negative answer when they can simply take matters into their 
own hands, act unilaterally, and pay the official market price after the fact?6  
The prevalent remedial regime fails to provide third parties with an ade-
quate motivation to elect negotiations over unilateral action.  The weak ex 
post protection encourages willful blindness with respect to private owner-
ship interests and renders the strong ex ante protection ownership enjoys ra-
ther meaningless.  The result is a mismatch between right and remedy: the 
most important right associated with property is protected with a remedy 
typical of the domain of accidents in the law of torts.  
One might suggest that this sorry state of affairs was born of necessity.  
Compensation at market value—so the argument goes—is the only practical 
remedy after a trespass ends.  Restoring the property rule protection of the 
owner after the fact by attempting to reconstruct her asking price is a futile 
and wasteful exercise.  The owner‘s asking price is private nonverifiable in-
formation.  At the time of the trial, after a trespass occurs, there may not be 
enough evidence regarding the owner‘s asking price, and her testimony on 
the matter cannot be trusted since she has an inherent incentive to shade up 
the real price in order to increase her compensation.  
This argument is overstated, however.  The problem of private infor-
mation is present in all areas of litigation, and evidence law deals with it 
reasonably well.  Evidentiary mechanisms that include burdens of proof and 
presumptions deliver workable solutions to this problem.7  Therefore, the 
 
 
 
6
  Cf. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All “Legal Dollars” Created Equal?, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 223, 236–50 (2008) (demonstrating experimentally that a person is generally more willing to en-
gage in conduct perceived as transactional, for which she expects to pay the set price, than to commit a 
―violation‖ triggering an identical payment in the form of a penalty). 
7
  See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 157–71 (2005). 
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challenge of private information does not necessitate setting the owner‘s 
compensation at market value.  To demonstrate this point, we introduce in 
this Essay two superior remedies.  The first remedy, and also the one that 
we recommend most, is ―propertized compensation.‖8  This remedy approx-
imates, ex post, the protection level enjoyed by owners ex ante.  Propertized 
compensation seeks to reinstate, to the extent feasible, the owner‘s right to 
exclude others and to set any price for occupation and use of her property.  
Although propertized compensation cannot always accurately replicate the 
owner‘s preferred asking price, it goes a long way towards adequately res-
toring the integrity of ownership and protecting owners against trespass.  
Importantly, we will show that propertized compensation outperforms not 
only market-value compensation but also punitive damages and disgorge-
ment, our second recommended remedy. 
To operationalize our proposal of propertized compensation, we turn to 
an evidentiary mechanism for expedient determination of compensation in 
real world trials.  We use the famous case of Armory v. Delamirie9 as a blu-
eprint for our design.  In Armory, a chimney sweep found a valuable jewel 
and entrusted it to a jeweler for appraisal.  The jeweler took the find and re-
fused to return it to the chimney sweep.  When the chimney sweep sued for 
replevin, the jeweler argued that he was no longer in possession of the jewel 
and refused to disclose what happened to it.  Instead of awarding the chim-
ney sweep market-value compensation, the court ordered that the jeweler 
either adduce reliable evidence regarding the actual price for which he sold 
the jewel or pay compensation commensurate with the price of the most 
valuable jewel fitting the socket that contained the original jewel.  
Generalizing from this case, we propose a set of rules to allocate bur-
dens of proof among the parties involved.  The aggrieved owner will bear 
the production burden with respect to her ex ante price.  This burden will 
require her to adduce evidence concerning her asking price, or property val-
uations from which this price can be extrapolated, for the period preceding 
the trespass.  This evidence will create a strong presumption that the own-
er‘s ex ante price is real.  To rebut this presumption, the trespasser will need 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner deliberately 
overstated her ex ante price.  If he fails to prove this, the court will affirm 
the owner‘s price and use it as a basis for calculating her compensation.  If 
the court finds the trespasser‘s evidence convincing, it will award the owner 
the going market rent.  These rules will uphold the right to exclude by reins-
tating the primacy of the owner‘s voice in fixing the price for another per-
son‘s use of her property.  They will eradicate the call option that 
anomalously benefits the trespasser under the current law and give the own-
 
 
 
8
  See infra Part II.A. 
9
  (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). 
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er a remedial put option instead.10  This option will allow the owner, after 
the event, to align the trespasser‘s compensation duty with the rental price 
she would have requested before the trespass.11 
A possible, albeit imperfect, alternative to propertized compensation is 
disgorgement of the trespasser‘s profit.12  Broadly defined, disgorgement 
would allow the aggrieved owner to force the trespasser to hand over all his 
trespass-related profits.  Under our proposed standard, any profit facilitated 
by the trespass would be subject to disgorgement.  Full enforcement of this 
remedy would protect ownership by eliminating a prospective encroacher‘s 
incentive to trespass.  
Disgorgement has a number of shortcomings, however.  First, as a 
compensatory device, disgorgement is inadequate because the trespasser‘s 
profits and the owner‘s losses from the trespass are not equal.  Therefore, 
the owner‘s ex post recovery amount will either be excessive or insufficient 
relative to her actual losses.13  Of course, full enforcement of the disgorge-
ment remedy would make this undesirable scenario extremely rare since po-
tential trespassers would be deterred from entering others‘ property.  A 
rational trespasser would never choose to commit trespass knowing that he 
would have to disgorge all trespass-related gains.  In reality, however, full 
disgorgement is unlikely to occur as it necessitates an accounting procedure 
that is both very costly and highly uncertain for the aggrieved party.14  
These twin problems necessarily reduce the probability of enforcement and 
the amount trespassers will expect to disgorge. 
For these reasons, we recommend the disgorgement remedy as a fall-
back for cases in which the owner‘s ex ante price is unascertainable and, 
consequently, propertized compensation cannot be awarded.  In such cases, 
instead of forcing the owner into a market-price rental transaction with the 
trespasser, courts should protect ownership by allowing the owner to collect 
the trespasser‘s profit.  This substitution of remedies would increase the 
costs of adjudication and law enforcement.  We believe, however, that the 
erosion of ownership effected by the current remedial regime costs society 
even more. 
 
 
 
10
  A call option in relation to an asset gives its holder the power to purchase the asset from the own-
er at a price set in advance (e.g., the market price).  Conversely, a put option entitles the owner to force 
another person into a purchase of the asset at a reserved price.  The two options allocate control over as-
set-related transactions.  The call option obliterates the owner‘s control over those transactions, while 
the put option makes this control absolute.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1403, 1444 (2009). 
11
  Cf. Ayres, supra note 5, at 798–813 (rationalizing other put options as property rule protections); 
see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854–56 (1993) (de-
scribing put options as reverse liability rules). 
12
  See infra Part II.B. 
13
  This problem explains the law‘s reluctance to recognize disgorgement as a remedy for trespass.  
See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
14
  See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
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After introducing the concepts of propertized compensation and dis-
gorgement, we use them to reorder, or reconceptualize, the law of trespass.  
We demonstrate that propertized compensation should be the preferred and 
standard remedy in trespass cases.  Disgorgement should function as an al-
ternative remedy in cases where the owner cannot recover propertized com-
pensation. 
Market-value compensation should not be abolished completely, how-
ever.  Rather, it should be reserved for two exceptional categories of cases: 
where the presence of an exigency makes it impossible for the trespasser to 
approach the owner for permission, as in the case of necessity, or where no 
voluntary transaction could be expected between the owner and the tres-
passer and the unauthorized entry stands to produce a significant benefit to 
society while causing only minimal proprietary harm to the owner, as in the 
case of media trespass.  Market-value compensation should also apply in 
cases involving good faith encroachment, where the encroacher had no 
cost-effective way to find out about the trespass and thus acted upon a rea-
sonable belief in the rightfulness of his actions.  
Our Essay makes four contributions to legal theory.  First, it identifies 
the hitherto underappreciated mismatch between rights and remedies in the 
law of trespass.  Second, it introduces the concept of propertized compensa-
tion, explains how it may be implemented, and outlines how it can serve as 
an organizing principle for trespass law.  Third, the discussion of remedies 
in this Essay provides an important complement to the analytical frame-
work established by Calabresi and Melamed in their Cathedral article15 by 
highlighting the important nexus between property and liability rules and by 
developing a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the remedial op-
tions they grouped together under the rubric of liability rules.  Fourth, our 
account underscores the centrality of evidentiary mechanisms to the design 
of substantive rights and remedies in private law. 
Structurally, the Essay unfolds in three parts.  Part I identifies the ano-
malous discrepancy between ex ante and ex post protections of ownership.  
Part II develops our propertized compensation and disgorgement proposals 
and delineates their respective scopes.  Part III examines the existing alter-
native to our proposals: imposition of punitive damages upon trespassers.  
A short conclusion follows. 
I. TWO FACES OF TRESPASS 
The right to exclude others is the most fundamental component of 
ownership.16  This right empowers the owner to prevent others from using, 
 
 
 
15
  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2.  
16
  See Merrill & Smith, What Happened?, supra note 1, at 360; Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Con-
tingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 561–62, 573 (1991); see 
also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 285 (2008) (ra-
tionalizing ownership as entrenching the owner‘s position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned 
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occupying, or taking her property.17  The owner can use various self-help 
measures to fend off unwanted third parties, including reasonable force.18  
More importantly, the owner is entitled to harness the power of the state to 
vindicate her right to exclude.19  She can rely on the police to remove un-
wanted persons from her property and turn to the courts to secure injunctive 
relief in cases of trespass or encroachment.   
This conventional account of the legal protection of ownership is undu-
ly sanguine.  There is a curious disconnect between how the owner‘s right 
to exclude is protected ex ante, before trespass occurs, and how it is pro-
tected ex post, after a trespass has been committed.  Ex ante, the law offers 
a property owner an impressive array of powers and remedies, all designed 
to help her fend off unwanted entry onto her property.  These powers and 
remedies protect the owner‘s autonomy to decide whom and what to allow 
on her property and at what price.  Furthermore, the law respects the own-
er‘s decisionmaking power even when her choices are unreasonable or 
downright exorbitant.  From an ex ante perspective, therefore, the law 
grants owners full discretion over the use of their property and its terms.  
Further, the law is committed to preventing others from usurping the own-
er‘s decisionmaking power.  
Ex post, however, the law takes a surprisingly different tack.  After a 
trespass is committed and removed, the law entitles the aggrieved owner to 
damages commensurate with the market value of the unwanted use of her 
property.  The law thus substitutes for the near absolute power the owner 
enjoyed ex ante a much weaker form of protection ex post, turning the own-
er from the queen of her castle to just another fief—or, in economic par-
lance, from a price maker to a price taker. 
Of course, this drop in protection after the fact undermines the strong 
protection granted to owners ex ante and erodes its deterrent effect on pros-
pective trespassers.  In the following sections, we take a close look at these 
two faces of the trespass doctrine.  We analyze the doctrinal disconnect be-
tween the ex ante and ex post protections of ownership and identify its 
anomalous consequences. 
                                                                                                                           
thing); see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Exclude] (attesting that the right to exclude is the key component of property 
ownership and examining its role in property law generally). 
17
  See Merrill & Smith, What Happened?, supra note 1, at 389 (defining the right to exclude as al-
lowing the owner ―to control, plan, and invest‖ in the use of her property); see also Merrill, Exclude, su-
pra note 16 at 740–45 (same); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 
1759 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules] (same). 
18
  See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Self Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 69, 80–86 
(2005) [hereinafter Smith, Self Help] (discussing the relationship between self-help and the right to ex-
clude).  
19
  See, e.g., Leo Katz, Choice, Consent and Cycling, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627, 667 (2006) (acknowl-
edging the possibility of relying on the police to fend off trespassers).  
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A. The Ex Ante View of Trespass 
The right to exclude—when protected by injunctive relief—confers 
upon the owner the privilege to demand any price for the use or occupation 
of her property.20  The requested price may be completely out of touch with 
reality and downright preposterous.  Yet the owner is legally entitled to ask 
for it.  A prospective buyer or user, of course, is free not to transact.  Alter-
natively, a buyer or user may try to persuade the owner to lower the price or 
opt to transact with other owners.  But unless the owner is a monopolist 
whose activities violate our antitrust laws or a landlord attempting to wor-
sen the position of a protected tenant, the prospective buyer (or user) cannot 
go to court and petition for an order forcing the owner to align her price 
with the market.  The court has no authority to issue such an order.  The 
right to exclude thus empowers the owner to offer her property on a ―take it 
or leave it‖ basis at a price of her choosing.  The owner thus enjoys a com-
prehensive immunity against forced transactions.  
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.  Olivia owns Longa-
cre, a tract of land that adjoins a construction site where Tom works as 
project manager.  Tom needs to park his pickup truck as close as possible to 
the construction site.  He approaches Olivia and offers to pay $900 a month 
for the right to park his truck on Longacre.  This amount is well above the 
going rates in the area.  But Olivia, a longtime environmentalist who abhors 
pickup trucks, turns the offer down and demands instead $3000 a month—
an utterly exorbitant amount.  She tells Tom that she intends to use $1000 
of that money for monthly donations to her favorite charity, ―Protect the 
Tree.‖  Olivia‘s demand prompts Tom to leave the scene without customary 
civilities. 
The following morning, unable to find a parking spot in the vicinity of 
the construction site, Tom decides to park his truck on Longacre and leave 
Olivia $30, a prorated daily payment based on the monthly rate he offered 
 
 
 
20
  For a detailed discussion, see infra Part II.A.  As Professor Glen Robinson explains:  
The right to resist forced transfers, regardless of their efficiency, is so fundamental to our concep-
tion of property rights as to be almost definitional.  If Alice refuses to sell, her reasons for refusal 
are irrelevant; it does not matter whether she is ―irrational‖ in her valuation of the amenities . . . or 
whether she is merely being ―strategic‖ in holding out for a greater share . . . .  No one who has 
even a smattering of legal knowledge would dispute this account as a positive statement of the 
law, and few who believe in private property would dispute it as a normative statement of what the 
law ought generally to be. 
Robinson, supra note 16, at 561–62. 
This privilege is fundamental to a free economy.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. 
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 42 (5th ed. 1989) (―The market can function 
only in a situation where the ‗exclusion principle‘ applies, i.e., where A‘s consumption is made contin-
gent on A‘s paying the price, while B, who does not pay, is excluded.  Exchange cannot occur without 
property rights, and property rights require exclusion.  Given such exclusion, the market can function as 
an auction system.  The consumer must bid for the product, thereby revealing preferences to the produc-
er, and the producer, under the pressures of competition, is guided by such signals to produce what con-
sumers want.‖). 
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to pay.  But as he approaches Longacre, he finds the property gate locked 
and a guard patrolling it.  The guard ignores Tom‘s plea to let him in, forc-
ing him to turn around, seek parking elsewhere, and lose two hours of work.  
Three days later, Tom receives in the mail a court order preliminarily en-
joining him from entering Longacre.  
This simple story summarizes the essence of the owner‘s right to ex-
clude.  Upset though Tom may be at Olivia‘s reaction, he has no legal re-
course against her.  All of Olivia‘s actions were perfectly within her legal 
rights.  The injunctive relief against Tom actualizes Olivia‘s ownership of 
Longacre.21  For centuries, the Anglo-American law has sided with property 
owners, vindicating their right to reject unwanted transactions and uses.  
With the notable exception of the state‘s eminent domain power,22 any non-
consensual entry, let alone taking, constitutes unlawful trespass.23  
B. The Ex Post View of Trespass 
Curiously, the property rule protection only applies ex ante, before a 
trespass occurs.  Ex post, the property rule protection becomes unavailable, 
and in its stead the aggrieved owner must settle for liability rule protection.  
Once a nonconsensual entry has been committed, the landowner can only 
receive a damage award commensurate with the market value of the unau-
thorized use.  Specifically, the amount is set at the going rent for the period 
of the trespass, plus any damage to the property caused by the trespass and 
any ancillary losses.24 
To illustrate how trespass is addressed ex post, let us reconstruct our 
previous example with Olivia and Tom.  Assume this time that Tom and 
Olivia never negotiated or even met.  Instead, one morning Tom decided to 
park his truck on Olivia‘s property, and upon getting there he was con-
fronted by neither a locked gate nor a security guard.  Rather, he found the 
gate open and unattended and promptly proceeded to park his truck on the 
property.  Furthermore, he learned from a neighbor that Olivia had left town 
to assist her ailing mother.  Tom decides to park his car on Longacre every 
weekday and does so for six months.  At that point, Olivia brings a lawsuit 
against Tom.  She seeks an injunction against him as well as damages in the 
 
 
 
21
  For a recent account of the right to exclude and its injunctive consequences, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability and Automatic Injunctions, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 593, 623–27 (2008) (justifying the right to exclude on grounds of inviola-
bility as a correlative of the obligation inviolability casts on others). 
22
  See Nicolle Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 109 (2006) (observing that the power of eminent domain ―deprives an owner of her ‗most es-
sential right‘ to exclude others—including, especially, the government—from her property‖).  
23
  See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 13, 16 (1985) (defining actionable trespass as ―an invasion of the column of space that 
defines A‘s possessory interest under the ad coelum rule‖); see also Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 
F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995) (―To enter upon another‘s land without consent is a trespass.‖). 
24
  See supra note 3 and sources cited therein. 
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amount of $18,000—the monthly price she would have demanded multip-
lied by the number of months Tom parked on her property—plus costs.  
Will the court award her the requested amount?  
In all likelihood, it will not.  Ex post, Olivia‘s right is subject to liabili-
ty rule protection.  She therefore will only be able to recover, in addition to 
costs, the market value of Tom‘s unauthorized parking.  This value equals 
the fare that car drivers pay for parking in a location similar to Longacre.  If 
the going fare is $200 per month, Olivia will only be able to collect 
$1200—a far cry from the $18,000 she requested.  At the end of the day, 
Tom was made better off by committing the trespass, and Olivia was made 
worse off.  Ironically, by circumventing the market—that is, by not nego-
tiating—Tom was able to deprive Olivia of her property rule protection and 
ensure that he paid only the court-determined market price for his unautho-
rized use of Olivia‘s lot. 
This outcome is deeply problematic.  Protection against forced transac-
tions is important for preserving the property owner‘s dominion.  Our socie-
ty has made the determination that an important component of property 
ownership is the right to exclude third parties from an asset, which confers 
upon the owner the power to set the price for the use of her property.  The 
ex post approach to trespass undermines this well-accepted concept of own-
ership.  The only way by which an owner can preserve her property rule 
protection is to obtain an injunction against the trespasser before the unau-
thorized entry occurs, but this ex ante remedy is often unavailable or im-
practicable.  In the regular case, owners simply cannot anticipate trespass 
and are unaware of the risk of its occurrence. 
Some readers may attempt to defend the doctrinal switch from property 
rule protection ex ante to liability rule protection ex post by appealing to 
tort theory.  The ex ante framework protects ownership against upcoming or 
ongoing trespass.  As such, it is controlled by property doctrine.  The doc-
trine‘s remedial mechanism—the injunction—restores the ownership order 
that was upset by the trespass.  The ex post framework performs a different 
function: it compensates people for harms that cannot be undone.  As such, 
it is regulated by tort doctrine.  This doctrine‘s remedial mechanism—
compensation—aims at making the victim whole and deterring future 
wrongdoers.  
The two objectives of tort doctrine practically dictate that tort damages 
be based on market values.  As far as victim compensation is concerned, the 
compensation amount should stay within the bounds of reasonableness as 
part of a hypothetical reciprocal arrangement—the social contract—
between community members who inadvertently expose each other to dif-
ferent risks of harm as they go about their business and daily affairs.25  The 
 
 
 
25
  This discussion draws on George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 537 (1972), who advocates a complete exemption from tort liability for damages associated with 
reciprocal impositions of risk, rationalizes the imposition of punitive damages for intentional torts, and 
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reciprocal confinement of the compensation awards to market value thus 
determines the fair amount of recovery for victims of accidents. 
Market-based valuation of damages also sets the optimal level of deter-
rence for tortfeasors.26  A person contemplating an activity that involves a 
risk of harm is typically unaware of the individual damage that he might 
cause.  The average damage is the only measure upon which such a person 
can rely in comparing the expected benefit of his activity with the expected 
harm it might produce.  Reliance on the average damage is socially desira-
ble.  The total damage that a repeated activity produces over time equals, 
roughly, the average damage multiplied by the number of cases in which 
the activity was carried out.  The average damage, therefore, is the right 
benchmark for fixing the required threshold for the activity‘s benefits.  
When those benefits exceed the average damage, the actor deserves an ex-
emption from tort liability.  Otherwise, he should be held liable for the 
damage caused.27  Market prices, or market values, represent the best ap-
proximation of the average harm—or at the very least provide an important 
informational basis for guiding behavior. 
The appeal to tort theory cannot carry the day in the trespass context, 
however.  Market-based valuation of the damage is only suitable for adjudi-
cating typical torts that involve accidents between strangers.28  Tortfeasors 
who cause such accidents do not harm their victims deliberately.  Nor can 
they identify those victims in advance and negotiate with them the risk of 
accidents and the prospect of future compensation.  Some trespasses fall in-
to the category of ―accident law‖ as well, but those trespasses are typically 
bona fide or de minimis encroachments.  Familiar examples are mistaken 
                                                                                                                           
supports the objective market-based assessment of accidental damages.  We also rely on Gregory C. 
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313–25 (1996) 
(updating and refining Fletcher‘s reciprocity thesis), and on John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort 
Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 567–69 (2003) (conceptualizing tort law as fair terms of cooperation among 
equals).  
26
  This criterion for assessing tort damages is dictated by the liability rule regime, rationalized by 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092 (―Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if 
he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.  
This value may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement would have sold it for.  But 
the holder‘s complaint that he would have demanded more will not avail him once the objectively de-
termined value is set.  Obviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention: not on-
ly are entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value 
determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves.‖). 
27
  This is a restatement of the famous Learned Hand formula.  See United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  For a recent application of the formula, see Mesman v. Crane 
Pro Servs., 512 F.3d 352, 354–55 (7th Cir. 2008). 
28
  See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 314–17 
(1994) (establishing that basing awards on average harm is efficient because it avoids costly ascertain-
ment of individualized damages ex ante and ex post); see also Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a 
Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1199, 1216–19 (2001) (explaining the efficiency of setting liability for accidents on the expected 
average damage). 
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entry into another person‘s unfenced land and a U-turn by a car that inad-
vertently drives over privately owned grass.  For these and other minimal 
encroachments, the liability rule protection is appropriate—a proposition 
we fully rationalize in Part II.C.  
Continuous trespasses that constitute a serious violation of a person‘s 
ownership do not typically fall into the ―accident between strangers‖ cate-
gory.  These trespasses are virtually always deliberate.  Most importantly, 
the trespasser can almost always negotiate a transaction with the owner be-
fore trespassing.  The owner‘s harm from a continuous trespass is different 
in kind from ordinary tort damages.  This harm includes more than just a 
temporary occupation of the owner‘s property, damage to her land and fix-
tures, the cost of removing the trespass, and the psychological harm suf-
fered from all of the above.  It also includes the violation of the owner‘s 
right to exclude others. 
This right and the corresponding immunity against forced transactions 
are the fundamentals of ownership.  In our hypothetical, Olivia exercised 
this right when she refused to let Tom park his car on her property for $900 
a month.  Olivia also exercised this right when she stated the $3,000 
monthly rental as her condition for allowing Tom to park his car on Longa-
cre.  Had she acted as she did in our original example and obtained an in-
junction, Tom would have been unable to park his truck on Longacre 
without paying her $3,000 a month.  If the law condones Tom‘s trespass, it 
will incentivize individuals to circumvent market transactions and avoid 
negotiations with property owners.  In economic parlance, the ex post ap-
proach to trespass may be described as creating in third parties a call option 
on the private properties of others—a call option that is, moreover, given 
away for free.29 
At this point, some readers may object to our analysis on the ground 
that it ignores the possibility of punitive damages.  We are cognizant of this 
option.30  However, punitive damages are awarded only in extreme and un-
usual cases.31  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes32 is unquestionably the best 
known example of the use of punitive damages in a case of trespass.  In 
 
 
 
29
  Since the strike price is market value, one should expect the option to be exercised whenever a 
third party values the use of someone else‘s property at more than market value. 
30
  See infra Part III. 
31
  See, e.g., Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 1988) (―Common law 
principles . . . indicate that reasonable rental value is the appropriate remedy for trespass.  Damage re-
medies for trespass are essentially compensatory and not punitive.‖ (citing Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil 
Corp., 119 P.2d 973 (1941); United States v. Marin Rock & Asphalt Co., 296 F. Supp. 1213 (C.D. Cal. 
1969))); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139, 149 (W. Va. 1982) (attesting that 
―[t]he measure of damages for trespass to realty ‗is the rental value of the property wrongfully occupied 
and withheld, with compensation for injury to the residue thereof‘‖ and that ―[i]t is axiomatic, in the ab-
sence of statutes providing multiple damages for a tenant‘s willful failure to surrender leased premises, 
that a lessor is entitled to the reasonable rental value of property wrongfully withheld by a lessee‖ (citing 
Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Co., 77 S.E. 525, 528 (1913))). 
32
  563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
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Jacque, the Wisconsin Supreme Court famously emphasized that ―in certain 
situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, 
which may be minimal, but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude 
others from his or her property.‖33  Based on this observation, the court es-
tablished a rule that a violation of the right to exclude ―may be punished by 
a large damage award despite the lack of measurable harm.‖34  Correspon-
dingly, the court reinstated an award of punitive damages in the amount of 
$100,000 for intentional trespass committed by a mobile-home supplier 
who plowed a path through the landowners‘ snow-covered field to shorten 
the delivery of a mobile home to their neighbor.35  
The facts of this case, however, demonstrate how unrepresentative it is.  
The defendant discovered that the easiest delivery route crossed the plain-
tiffs‘ field and asked the plaintiffs a number of times to allow it to take this 
route, but the plaintiffs repeatedly refused.  The defendant‘s manager was 
unimpressed by the plaintiffs‘ right to exclude others from their property.  
He told his subordinates, ―I don‘t give a —— what [Mr. Jacque] said, just 
get the home in there any way you can,‖36 and ordered them to deliver the 
home through the plaintiffs‘ land.37  This addition of insult to the tort of 
trespass brought the case into a special category of ―reprehensible torts,‖ 
calling for the imposition of punitive damages.38  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court‘s decision to reinstate the damage award to the plaintiffs underscored 
the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct.39  The court‘s additional and 
arguably more central reason for this decision, however, was the violation 
of the owners‘ right to exclude others and the court‘s inability to remedy 
this violation by forcing the trespasser to pay the landowner market-priced 
rent.40  Under our theory, this reason for obligating trespassers to pay puni-
tive damages suffices.  The court‘s allusion to the trespasser‘s reprehensi-
bility as another relevant factor makes Jacque an untidy example of 
propertized compensation.  Other cases predominantly follow the same re-
prehensibility rationale.41 
 
 
 
33
  Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
34
  Id. (citing McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 428 (1854)). 
35
  Id. at 163–66. 
36
  Id. at 157. 
37
  Id. 
38
  The court described the defendant‘s actions as ―egregious,‖ ―deceitful,‖ and ―reprehensible.‖  Id. 
at 164.  Furthermore, the Jacques had previously lost part of their property as a result of adverse posses-
sion, id. at 157, and were therefore highly sympathetic plaintiffs. 
39
  See id. at 164. 
40
  Id. at 160–61. 
41
  See, e.g., Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App. 2006) (affirming imposition of 
punitive damages upon trespasser who trimmed neighbor‘s tree with ―specific intent to cause substantial 
injury to [the neighbor]‖ and explaining that ―the cases prescribing exemplary damages for a ‗malicious‘ 
or ‗willful‘ trespass are based on the old, common law ‗actual malice‘ definition requiring proof of ‗ill-
will, spite, evil motive, or purposing the injuring of another‘‖ (quoting Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 
818, 822 (Tex. 1969))); Mission Res., Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust, 166 S.W.3d 301, 318–20 (Tex. App. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1836 
Another narrow exception to the general rule of setting compensation 
at market value is a statutory double-rent provision for holdover tenants that 
has been adopted by several states.  Application of this provision does not 
depend on the holdover tenant‘s malice or reprehensibility.  The provision 
simply requires a holdover tenant to pay the landowner, for the period of his 
unauthorized possession of the property, ―double the rent which he should 
otherwise have paid.‖42  The double-rent sanction, however, only applies to 
tenants who continue to occupy the landlord‘s property after the tenancy‘s 
termination.  Moreover, it is available only in those few jurisdictions that 
have enacted special holdover tenancy statutes.  Most jurisdictions have no 
such statutes and still follow the common law market-rent approach.  Final-
ly, even in those jurisdictions that recognize the owner‘s right to collect 
double rent, courts only award the remedy if it is clear that the owner did 
not explicitly or implicitly acquiesce to the tenant‘s stay.  
At the end of the day, then, punitive damages awards are few and far 
between and consequently do very little to undermine the generality of 
market-value compensation.  Furthermore, for reasons set forth in Part III 
below, we believe that punitive damages should be sparingly used in tres-
pass cases because superior policy tools can bridge the ex ante–ex post gap.  
The upshot of all this is that, in the standard case, a trespasser can force 
the landowner to transact with him based on the going market rate.  Effec-
tively, he can rent the landowner‘s property at the going rate until the lan-
downer forces him out either by securing a court order against him or by 
self-help, if the trespass is very recent.43  By occupying another‘s property, 
                                                                                                                           
2005) (affirming punitive damage award in the amount of $10 million against trespasser who conducted 
hydraulic fracturing through its well to break up rock formation and steal trapped gas underneath own-
ers‘ property); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 
105–07 (2007) (discussing representative cases that require a showing of malice and reprehensibility as 
a condition for holding a trespasser liable for punitive damages). 
42
  MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-7-25 (2009).  Typical of double-rent laws, the Mississippi statute provides 
that ―[w]hen a tenant, being lawfully notified by his landlord, shall fail or refuse to quit the demised 
premises and deliver up the same as required by the notice, or when a tenant shall give notice of his in-
tention to quit the premises at a time specified, and shall not deliver up the premises at the time ap-
pointed, he shall, in either case, thenceforward pay to the landlord double the rent which he should 
otherwise have paid, to be levied, sued for, and recovered as the single rent before the giving of notice 
could be; and double rent shall continue to be paid during all the time the tenant shall so continue in pos-
session.‖  For additional examples, see N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:42-5 (West 2009) (imposing double rent on 
holdover tenants); see also Miss. State Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare v. Howie, 449 So. 2d 772, 777–78 (Miss. 
1984) (explaining the differences between Mississippi‘s double-rent statute for holdover tenants, MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 89-7-25, and the market-rent approach of the common law). 
43
  We need to acknowledge the possibility of a criminal sanction.  This sanction—typically a fine—
is virtually never set high enough to deter trespass.  See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 
154, 161 (Wis. 1997) (describing the applicable $30 forfeiture as ―halfpenny‖).  In some jurisdictions, a 
landowner can also collect treble damages from a trespasser who has intentionally cut or removed trees, 
timber, or vegetation.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346(a) (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-560 
(2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4278.1.B (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 242, § 7 (2009).  Theoretically, 
of course, a heavy criminal sanction—imprisonment or a skyrocketing fine—would deter trespass, but 
its social cost would be prohibitively high.  See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of 
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the trespasser not only violates the owner‘s right to keep him off her proper-
ty, he also changes the remedial baseline from a property rule to a liability 
rule regime.  The trespasser‘s ability to unilaterally change the legal protec-
tions provided to the owner compromises the core element of ownership: 
the owner‘s right to exclude others and to demand any price for allowing 
another person to use her property.44   
This mismatch between rights and remedies is disconcerting.  The 
owner‘s right to exclude others deserves an equal degree of protection ex 
ante and ex post.  This means that the compensation award should ideally 
equal the amount that the owner would have agreed to accept ex ante in a 
voluntary transaction with the defendant.  This amount may be above the 
market prices collectively set by owners of comparable properties.  But be-
ing an owner allows a person to form and act upon her own assessment of 
her property‘s potential uses and value.45  In real world settings, the owner‘s 
ex ante price is often unverifiable, which presents a serious evidentiary 
problem for adjudicators.  This problem, however, does not necessitate 
compensation at market value.  As we will show in the next Part, courts can 
develop a cost-effective evidentiary mechanism that would allow them to 
reach a reliable approximation of the owner‘s ex ante price. 
II. RETROFITTING THE CATHEDRAL 
In their seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed 
provided a rigorous and comprehensive framework for analyzing remedies 
in private law.46  They also developed a taxonomy consisting of three broad 
categories of legal rules that protect entitlements: property rules, liability 
rules, and inalienability rules.  According to their definitions, an entitlement 
is protected by a property rule when its holder gets to set the price for the 
use of the entitlement and nonconsensual attempts to take the entitlement 
will be met with an injunction.47  Liability rule protection, in contrast, does 
not entitle the holder to determine the price for the use of her entitlement, 
                                                                                                                           
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1236–37 (1985) (explaining that im-
prisonment and other supracompensatory penalties are costlier than, and therefore inferior to, compensa-
tory remedies). 
44
  See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (holding that the landowner‘s right to 
exclude others from his or her land is ―one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property‖ (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 
(1979))). 
45
  See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 17, at 1722–31, 1755–56 (defending a decentralized prop-
erty system in which owners increase wealth by making individualized choices between utilizations of 
assets that are numerous and heterogeneous). 
46
  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2.  For a discussion of the voluminous literature inspired 
by Calabresi and Melamed‘s article, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–25 (2002). 
47
  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1105. 
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but rather entrusts this power to a third party48—typically a court, the legis-
lature, or an administrative agency.49  Nonconsensual breaches of the en-
titlements protected by a liability rule will result in a damages award to the 
plaintiff.50  Inalienability rule protection puts entitlements outside the boun-
daries of markets, prohibiting their holders from selling them even if they 
desire to do so.51  
Its immense significance notwithstanding, the Calabresi–Melamedian 
framework obfuscates the important connection between the ex ante and ex 
post protection of property rights.  Indeed, their discussion of damages 
proceeds on a fairly general level of abstraction and fails to recognize the 
connection between the ex ante protection of an entitlement and the com-
pensation measure that should be awarded ex post in the case of its breach.  
Calabresi and Melamed classify trespass doctrine as a paradigmatic exam-
ple of property rule protection—a classification based exclusively on the ex 
ante view of trespass as an imminent or ongoing transgression that must be 
stopped and removed.  Yet they fail to address the more important chal-
lenge (at least in practical terms) of ex post remediation of a property 
right‘s infringement.  Likewise, they treat compensatory relief as belonging 
exclusively to the domain of liability rules,52 again blurring the important 
connection between the initial protection of an entitlement and the monetary 
relief that should be awarded for its violation.  More generally, Calabresi 
and Melamed‘s insistence on establishing property rule protection and lia-
bility rule protection as distinct categories blinds them to the interplay be-
tween the categories and the implications thereof.  
Furthermore, Calabresi and Melamed treat damages as a black box.  
Although they discuss damages at great length, they do not distinguish 
among different types of damage awards, let alone discuss the appropriate 
conditions for using various compensatory measures.  As a result, the Cala-
bresi–Melamedian framework is descriptively and normatively incomplete.  
We seek to complement Calabresi and Melamed‘s analysis by propos-
ing a more nuanced system of remedies, predicated on a principled separa-
tion between propertized and market-based compensation.  Our more 
general goal is to craft a comprehensive remedial framework for trespass 
cases.  Our proposed framework is predicated on three remedial measures: 
(a) propertized compensation; (b) disgorgement of the trespasser‘s profit; 
and (c) market-price compensation.  
 
 
 
 
48
  Id. at 1105–06. 
49
  Id. at 1122 n.62. 
50
  Id. at 1106. 
51
  Id. at 1106, 1111–12. 
52
  See id. at 1105–07, 1110 (situating compensation in the domain of liability rules and distributive 
justice). 
103:1823  (2009) Reconceptualizing Trespass 
 1839 
Our main innovation lies in the introduction of the concept of ―proper-
tized compensation.‖  Propertized compensation, as we define it, is a dam-
age measure that sets compensation equal to the owner‘s pre-trespass 
asking price.  We argue that propertized compensation should become a 
standard remedial option in trespass cases.  Use of this measure will reins-
tate the owner in the position of a price maker, entitling her to recover the 
amount that she would have agreed to accept ex ante in a voluntary ex-
change.  As we explain in detail below, this remedial option will be availa-
ble to owners who can adduce reliable evidence concerning their pre-
trespass asking price. 
The remedial menu we offer to such owners, however, is not limited to 
propertized compensation.  Rather, owners may choose among propertized 
compensation, disgorgement of the trespasser‘s profits, and market-price 
compensation.  Each owner will decide for herself which path she will pur-
sue based on her expected recovery amount.  In a typical case, the owner 
will seek propertized compensation.  As we show, there will be cases in 
which an owner will be able to prove what that amount would be without 
undue cost or burden.  As an alternative remedy, the owner will be entitled 
to collect the trespasser‘s profit.  The owner would typically prefer this re-
medy when she has no reliable evidence concerning her pre-trespass asking 
price.  The disgorgement remedy we afford owners is geared towards deter-
ring trespassers from attempting to circumvent market transactions and in-
ducing them to negotiate with owners.  For reasons we will explain, proving 
the trespasser‘s profit may be harder and costlier than producing the evi-
dence necessary to collect propertized compensation.  But we leave the 
choice of remedy to the owner‘s case-specific determination. 
In addition, the aggrieved owner will always be able to recover from 
the trespasser the market-priced rent.  The owner will seek this remedy 
when she cannot produce credible evidence regarding her pre-trespass ask-
ing price and when the trespasser‘s profits are below the market rent.53 
The owner‘s remedial options are summarized in Table 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53
  The owner may prefer to seek market-value compensation even when the trespasser‘s profits are 
higher than the market rent if the cost of proving those profits far exceeds the cost of establishing the 
market rent.  
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Table 1: Owner Type and Remedial Options 
Owners who have evidence of above-
market pre-trespass asking price 
Choice between:  
(a) propertized compensation;  
(b) disgorgement of trespasser‘s prof-
it; and 
(c) market-price compensation 
Owners who do not have evidence 
concerning above-market pre-trespass 
asking price 
Choice between:  
(a) disgorgement of trespasser‘s prof-
it; and 
(b) market-price compensation 
 
Our proposed remedial scheme serves the dual purposes of deterrence 
and restoration.  Our optional approach increases the owner‘s expected re-
covery amount.  Consider, for example, an owner with a 75% chance of re-
covering propertized compensation in the amount of $100,000, a 15% 
chance of collecting $200,000 as a disgorgement amount, and a 10% chance 
of falling back on the market-based compensation, priced at $70,000.  The 
owner‘s suit has an expected value of $112,000.  This suit is more likely to 
deter trespassers than a parallel suit under the extant regime (for only 
$70,000).  
Our remedial scheme is suitable for most cases of trespass.  There are 
some special cases, however, that do not call for propertized compensation 
or disgorgement.  These cases include trespass by necessity, media trespass, 
and bona fide encroachments.  In these cases, the owner‘s compensation 
should be scaled back to market value.  These special cases have a common 
denominator: the impossibility or impracticality of a voluntary transaction 
between the parties.54  For reasons we will explain, all three cases are cha-
racterized by circumstances that make a voluntary transaction between the 
owner and the trespasser highly unlikely.  This means that the owner could 
never have collected her asking price ex ante and thus should not be entitled 
to propertized compensation (or disgorgement) ex post.  
In the remainder of this Part, we elaborate on the concept of proper-
tized compensation and explain how courts can arrive at this measure.  Sub-
sequently, we analyze the disgorgement remedy and set forth a reform 
proposal that will make it effectual in trespass cases.  Finally, we identify 
the special conditions under which courts should withhold both propertized 
compensation and disgorgement of profits.   
 
 
 
54
  In some of these cases, trespass is also likely to augment social welfare, but this is not the cases‘ 
general characteristic. 
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A. Propertizing Compensation 
Propertized compensation, as we already explained, equals the amount 
that the owner of the trespassed property would have accepted prior to the 
encroachment for allowing the defendant to use her property.  We now de-
scribe the features of this general remedial norm and design an evidentiary 
mechanism that would enable courts to implement this norm under real 
world constraints. 
The amount that the wronged property owner would have agreed to ac-
cept from the defendant prior to his trespass is inherently uncertain.  In real 
world cases, courts would generally be unable to determine this amount be-
cause it is based on private information that is neither observable nor verifi-
able.  Asking the owner after the fact how much she would have charged is 
unlikely to yield an honest response because at this point the owner has a 
strong incentive to overstate the asking price.  
The owner‘s pre-trespass valuations of her property for either rental or 
selling purposes would be far better evidence than her testimony in court.  
Those valuations are creditworthy because they took place in the context of 
actual or contemplated transactions.  Of course, a property owner may an-
ticipate future trespass as a general possibility and strategically ask for high 
prices in order to exact high compensation from those who trespass on her 
property in the future.  But asking for an exorbitant rental or selling price 
would normally be against the owner‘s interest.  The anticipated trespass 
might or might not materialize, while in the meantime her overstated de-
mand would kill a good transaction in the real world.  Property owners, 
therefore, would be loath to adopt this preemptive strategy.  
Because asking for an exorbitant rental or selling price involves a se-
rious downside for the owner, it constitutes ―costly signaling.‖55  The own-
er‘s signal—a statement to a potential buyer or renter of her property about 
the demanded price—is reliable because an attempt to cheat is costly to the 
owner.  For example, Olivia‘s demand that Tom pay her $3,000 a month for 
parking his pickup on her lot appears exorbitant.  This demand, nonetheless, 
was a ―costly signal,‖ rather than ―cheap talk,‖ because by making it Olivia 
risked—and actually lost—an attractive rental transaction offered by Tom.  
Hence, Olivia‘s demand was likely sincere.  If so, the court should use it as 
a basis for calculating her propertized compensation for the six-month tres-
pass perpetrated by Tom.  In the absence of counterproof, the court should 
obligate Tom to pay Olivia $18,000. 
The owner‘s ex post valuation, on the other hand, will nearly always be 
―cheap talk.‖  Theoretically, of course, testifying in court subject to penal-
ties for perjury is not completely cost free.  If the owner decides to cheat, 
 
 
 
55
  For an illuminating discussion of costly signaling, as contrasted with ―cheap talk,‖ in contract ne-
gotiations, see Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the 
Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 404–39 (1999). 
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her lies may be detected and she may consequently be prosecuted, con-
victed, and punished as a perjurer.  But the probability of that happening is 
infinitesimally low: in the absence of evidence as to the owner‘s prior valu-
ations that contradicts her testimony in court, proving perjury would be im-
possible.  
The problem of private nonverifiable information is ubiquitous but not 
insurmountable.  Evidence law deals with this problem in all areas of litiga-
tion, and it does so quite successfully.  It employs mechanisms that elicit 
private information from self-interested litigants by creating strong incen-
tives against cheating.56  These incentives are set by burdens of proof and 
evidentiary presumptions.57  Application of these presumptions and burdens 
forces a person to choose between revealing the truth, however uncomfort-
able it may be, and sending a signal about possibly being a cheater.  This 
self-identifying signal would prompt the factfinder to draw an adverse infe-
rence against its sender.58  If that person is a witness, the factfinder would 
disbelieve his testimony.  If that person is a party to the underlying litiga-
tion, the factfinder would make a finding against her.  The essence of this 
evidentiary mechanism is nicely captured by Lord Byron‘s observation: 
―And, after all, what is a lie?  ‗Tis but the truth in masquerade . . . .‖59 
In what follows, we design an evidentiary mechanism geared toward 
attaining three goals.  The first goal is to elicit from the property owner reli-
able information about her ex ante asking price.  The second goal is to 
reinstate the owner‘s status as a price maker and holder of the right to ex-
clude.  The third goal is to discourage future trespassing.  This mechanism 
would enable courts to make adequate assessments of propertized compen-
sation under conditions of uncertainty.  Those assessments would make the 
property rule regime function properly not only ex ante, but also ex post.  
Our proposed mechanism has three mutually dependent components.  
First, the aggrieved property owner would have to satisfy the burden of 
producing evidence.  She would have to adduce evidence that, if believed, 
would call for a factual finding in her favor.  This rule is in complete 
alignment with positive law.60  
The mechanism‘s second component is meant to elicit the best availa-
ble evidence of the owner‘s rental price.  Under this rule, the owner would 
only be able to rely on her pre-trespass evaluations of the property.  Evi-
dence to this effect can be found in the owner‘s past negotiations with po-
tential buyers and renters, in her correspondence with realtors, in surveyors‘ 
 
 
 
56
  See STEIN, supra note 7, at 143. 
57
  Id. at 157–71. 
58
  Id. 
59
  GEORGE GORDON LORD BYRON, DON JUAN canto XI, st. 37, at 378 (Chiltern Library 1949) 
(1949). 
60
  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 473 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (stating the 
general rule of placing the production burden on the plaintiff). 
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reports, and in drafts of agreements and other preexisting business records.61  
The owner‘s ex post appraisal of her would-be rental price would be inad-
missible.  This rule is designed to separate the owner‘s ―costly signals‖ 
from mere ―cheap talk,‖ allowing only the former to be taken into account 
as evidence. 
The third and last component of our mechanism concerns the alloca-
tion of the burden of persuasion.  The owner would discharge her eviden-
tiary obligations by adducing evidence concerning her ex ante price (or 
range of prices reflecting her pre-trespass appraisals of the property).  From 
this point on, the onus would be on the trespasser to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the owner‘s price was unreal (as opposed to being 
merely unrealistic from a market-based perspective).  If the trespasser failed 
to prove this, the owner‘s price would be deemed valid and the court would 
have to use it as a basis for calculating her compensation.  In other words, 
when the factfinder is undecided about the owner‘s ex ante price, it would 
have to accept the owner‘s evidence as true. 
This burden-shifting rule would significantly improve the owner‘s po-
sition as a plaintiff in a civil suit.  Normally, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of establishing each and every element of his suit by a preponderance of the 
evidence.62  Evidence law shifts this burden to defendants only in special 
cases and on policy grounds that are overwhelmingly strong.63  These 
grounds are present here.  Adoption of our burden-shifting proposal would 
allow the legal system to produce three socially beneficial effects.  First, the 
proposed rule would reinstate the owner‘s voice as the decisive factor in 
setting the price for the use of her property.  The act of trespass evidences 
the trespasser‘s unwillingness or inability to bargain down the owner‘s ask-
ing price.  The trespasser therefore should not be allowed simply to argue in 
his defense that the owner‘s ex ante price was unreal and that she would 
have accepted the going market price.  Instead, the law should require the 
trespasser to prove this claim by convincing evidence.  Second, our pro-
posed rule also would not allow the trespasser to benefit from the uncertain-
ty of the owner‘s ex ante price.  Since the uncertainty is a direct 
consequence of the unlawful trespass, it is the trespasser—not the property 
owner—who should bear the cost of the uncertainty on the outcome of the 
case.64  Hence, the risk of error in ascertaining the owner‘s ex ante price 
should be borne by the trespasser.  Placing this risk on the owner would be 
manifestly unjust.  Finally, having the trespasser bear the burden of persua-
 
 
 
61
  Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and its many state equivalents render business records admissi-
ble as evidence of the truth of their contents.  E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 
(West 2009).  The hearsay rule consequently does not block their admission into evidence. 
62
  See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 60, § 339, at 483.  
63
  Id. § 343, at 500–06 (specifying paradigmatic policy grounds for shifting the persuasion burden 
to defendants). 
64
  See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 160–84 (2001). 
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sion on the price issue would intensify the general deterrence against tres-
pass.  The consequent decrease in the incidences of trespass would benefit 
society. 
Adoption of a burden-shifting rule as a means of protecting ownership 
has ancient roots at common law.  This remedy-propertizing measure was 
established in a classic property law case, Armory v. Delamirie,65 which fea-
tured a goldsmith who converted a jewel from a ring brought to him by a 
chimney sweep for appraisal.  In response to the goldsmith‘s refusal to dis-
close the whereabouts of the jewel, the court instructed the jurors to award 
the chimney sweep damages based on the price of the most expensive jewel 
that fitted the ring‘s socket. 
This approach was carried over into trespass law by a few old deci-
sions involving mine-trespassing extraction of ore and coal.66  In a once fre-
quently cited case, Little Pittsburg, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on 
the Armory principle as a guide for adjudicating damage claims resulting 
from trespass.67  Specifically, the court held that:  
[A] man who willfully places the property of another in a situation 
where . . . its true amount or value [cannot be] ascertained . . . will . . . be com-
pelled to bear the inconvenience of the uncertainty . . . which he has pro-
duced . . . [by] responding in damages for the highest value at which the 
property in question can reasonably be estimated.68 
Modern courts did not follow the principle announced in that case, but did 
not formally overrule it either.69  Outside the trespass area, however, Armo-
ry and its underlying notion of liability for evidential damage still remain 
good law.70  
Admittedly, under our proposed system, only owners who can produce 
evidence concerning their pre-trespass reserve prices will be entitled to re-
ceive propertized compensation.  It should be emphasized that propertized 
compensation is an optional remedy that owners are free to forego.  Thus, 
all owners—both those who can prove their pre-trespass asking price and 
 
 
 
65
  (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). 
66
  See, e.g., Little Pittsburg Consol. Mining Co. v. Little Chief Consol. Mining Co., 17 P. 760 (Colo. 
1888). 
67
  Id. at 763–64. 
68
  Id. at 763 (quoting 1 JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON VARIOUS 
BRANCHES OF THE LAW: WITH NOTES 679 (1888–89)). 
69
  The last case positively citing Little Pittsburg for this principle is from 1926.  See Page v. Savage, 
246 P. 304, 309 (Idaho 1926). 
70
  See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998) (associating adverse 
inference against spoliator of evidence with Armory); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 
718, 721 (Tex. 2003) (same); see also Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 102 A.2d 538, 541 (Del. 1954) 
(―It is the duty of a court, in such a case of willful destruction of evidence, to adopt a view of the facts as 
unfavorable to the wrongdoer as the known circumstances will reasonably admit.  The maxim is that 
everything will be presumed against the despoiler.‖). 
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those who cannot—will have the option of collecting the trespasser‘s profits 
or, alternatively, market-price compensation. 
B. Disgorgement of Profits 
A different way to protect the owner‘s rights is through the remedy of 
disgorgement.71  Allowing the owner to collect the trespasser‘s profits 
would not only improve her compensation but would also enhance the de-
terrent effect vis-à-vis prospective trespassers.  Facing the prospect of dis-
gorgement, a rational trespasser might decide to abandon his plan.72 
The disgorgement remedy, however, does not reflect the asking price 
of the aggrieved owner, nor does it seek to approximate that price.  There is 
no necessary correlation between the benefit to the trespasser and the harm 
to the owner.  These benefits and harms correspond to each other only acci-
dentally.  As a result, in some cases, disgorgement will excessively com-
pensate the aggrieved property owner, while in others it will inadequately 
protect the owner‘s interests.  This shortcoming makes disgorgement an in-
ferior restorative remedy to propertized compensation. 
Another shortcoming of the disgorgement remedy is its high informa-
tional cost.  To obtain disgorgement, the owner would need to produce evi-
dence identifying the trespasser‘s profits.  To get the necessary evidence, 
the owner would need to initiate an accounting-for-profits proceeding.  
Consequently, the owner‘s claim would become dependent on the trespass-
er‘s private information, which is both difficult to obtain and costly to veri-
fy.73  Additionally, the owner might encounter obstacles in establishing a 
causal link between the trespasser‘s profits and the trespass.74  These evi-
dentiary problems have no cost-effective solutions.75 
 
 
 
71
  See HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES 18 
(1997) (commending disgorgement of the invader‘s profits as a remedy that ―vindicates the plaintiff‘s 
liberty to control the entitlement as part of her private sphere‖);  see also Richard R.W. Brooks, The Ef-
ficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 583–84 (2006) (identifying conditions in breach-of-
contract cases under which an efficiency-driven legal system should let the promissee choose between 
specific performance and disgorgement of the breacher‘s profits); Steven Thel & Peter Siegelman, The 
Role of Disgorgement in Contract Law (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1353402, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1353402 (identifying disgorge-
ment‘s advantages as a policy tool in contract law by showing that the defaulter‘s profit is usually ascer-
tainable and reflects the amount sufficient for deterrence). 
72
  Whether he actually would desist would depend on the scope and likelihood of the disgorgement 
remedy. 
73
  See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 275 (2004). 
74
  Id. 
75
  See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in 
Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1350 & n.31 (1985) (attesting that accounting for profits for 
purposes of disgorgement is an uncertain, complicated, lengthy, and expensive procedure); see also Aro 
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (acknowledging the Patent 
Act‘s substitution of injunctive relief for profit accounting and commending it for its simplicity).  Cf. 
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Remediation of trespass by disgorgement also clashes with the preva-
lent legal tradition.  Under current law, the disgorgement remedy is appli-
cable only in a small set of cases that satisfy a strict causation requirement.  
To obtain this remedy, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant‘s unlaw-
ful gain originated from her loss.76  The defendant‘s liability may trigger 
disgorgement only when the defendant enriches himself by taking an un-
lawful action that erodes the plaintiff‘s wealth or wealth-generating capabil-
ities.  For example, when David steals a taxicab that belongs to Peter and 
drives paying passengers, all his gains are subject to disgorgement and re-
coverable by Peter.  But if David drives passengers in a sedan he stole from 
Paula—an orthopedic surgeon—the disgorgement remedy will be unavaila-
ble.  Paula will only be able to recover from David (apart from any damage 
to the car and the cost of the gasoline) the rental value of the car‘s unautho-
rized use or, alternatively, wear and tear.77  
With respect to trespass specifically, the law has adopted the so-called 
―no-disgorgement‖ rule.78  The Restatement summarizes this rule as fol-
lows:  
The ―No-Disgorgement‖ Rule 
(1) A person who tortiously has taken possession of another‘s land without the 
other‘s consent is not thereby under a duty of restitution to the other for its 
value or use, except a person who, having the power to take the land by emi-
nent domain for a particular purpose, has taken possession of it for such pur-
pose but does not take the required proceedings. 
(2) A person who has trespassed upon the land of another is not thereby under 
a duty of restitution to the other for the value of its use, except a person who 
has tortiously grazed his animals upon the other‘s land to which he makes no 
claim of right. 
(3) A person who has tortiously severed and taken possession of anything in or 
upon the land of another to which he makes no claim of right is under a duty of 
restitution to the other.79 
                                                                                                                           
Thel & Siegelman, supra note 71, at 43–44 (arguing that accounting for profits is not difficult in con-
tract-based litigation). 
76
  For a classic statement and analysis of this requirement, see Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1343–
50.  For a classic case exemplifying it, see Edwards v. Lee‘s Adm‘r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1028–33 (Ky. 
1936) (ordering entrepreneur who maintained and charged admission to a scenic cave, one third of 
which extended under a neighbor‘s property, to pay the neighbor one third of his net profits).  For an 
illuminating discussion of this case that underscores the intrinsic value of property ownership, see 
DAGAN, supra note 71, at 76–78. 
77
  Paula also might be entitled to punitive damages, but, again, not to disgorgement of David‘s prof-
its. 
78
  For a recent example of this approach, see Meridien Hotels, Inc. v. LHO Fin. P‘ship, 255 S.W.3d 
807, 821 (Tex. App. 2008) (exempting from disgorgement management fees earned by trespasser be-
cause trespasser paid the landlord holdover rent that equaled 1.5 times the previously agreed amount and 
the landlord failed to explain to the court ―why these damages would not make it whole‖). 
79
  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 129 (1937). 
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This provision limits the landowner‘s remedy against trespassers to tort 
damages.  As the Restatement explains:  
A disseises B of Blackacre and opens a store thereon, making thereby a profit 
of $10,000.  The reasonable rental value of the land is $1000 for the period oc-
cupied by A.  In addition to regaining the land, B is entitled only to $1000 in 
an action of tort.  B is not entitled to maintain an action of assumpsit.80 
This and an additional example provided by the Restatement81 illustrate the 
inability of the disgorgement remedy to restore the ex ante property rule 
protection of the owner.  
The strict causation standard aims at achieving restitution, the main 
goal of the law of unjust enrichment.82  Restitution, in turn, is concerned 
with ill-gotten gains—specifically, gains accrued to a defendant from an un-
lawful action that decreased the plaintiff‘s wealth or economic opportuni-
ties.  This causation requirement situates the defendant‘s self-generated 
opportunities and wealth beyond the reach of disgorgement.  In economic 
terms, the defendant is entitled to keep his Pareto-improving gain to him-
self.  This rule benefits ―efficient trespassers‖ such as Tom and the mobile-
home mover in Jacque (assuming neither of them pays punitive damages). 
However, the ostensibly Paretian claim that the trespasser‘s self-
enriching activity did not make the owner worse off is flawed.  This claim 
proceeds from a narrow economic baseline that accounts for each party‘s 
pre-trespass wealth and wealth-generating opportunities, but not for the 
owner‘s right to exclude as a freestanding good.  The Paretian claim is thus 
predicated on an unreasoned rejection of the principle of ownership.  This 
unprincipled premise invalidates the claim.  
The disgorgement remedy can be improved by relaxing the strict cau-
sation requirement to allow the aggrieved owner to capture any profit facili-
tated by the trespass.  The adoption of a facilitation criterion, which we 
 
 
 
80
  Id. illus. 1. 
81
  Id. illus. 2 (―A uses a road across B‘s land without B‘s knowledge for a period of two years in the 
transportation of materials, doing so without harm to the land.  A saves $2,000 thereby.  A reasonable 
charge for the use of the road would be $200 per year.  B is not entitled to recover for the use of the land 
in an action of assumpsit; in an action of tort he is entitled to recover only $200.‖). 
82
  See id. § 3 (―A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense of another.‖); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 at 7  (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (summarizing 
positive law of restitution by attesting that ―[t]he case for relief is especially compelling when the ele-
ment of gain on one side is matched by loss on the other, and both result from a single wrongful act‖); 
id. § 1 at 8–9 (―A person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another person‘s inter-
est, or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to pre-
vent unjust enrichment.‖); Ernest Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 
1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 37 (2000) (rationalizing the law of unjust enrichment as undoing 
the proprietary deprivation suffered by the plaintiff).  
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recommend, would increase the protection granted to owners.83  Under the 
strict causation standard, Olivia, for example, would not be able to recover 
any fraction of Tom‘s earnings even though it is clear that his continual 
trespass of her property helped him make those earnings.  Tom‘s work as a 
project manager, as opposed to his prework parking of his truck, did not 
utilize Olivia‘s property.  His earnings from that work consequently escape 
disgorgement.  Under a facilitation standard, by contrast, Tom would have 
to disgorge a fraction of those earnings. 
By expanding the scope of trespassers‘ gains that are subject to dis-
gorgement, the facilitation standard would produce two beneficial effects.  
First, it would depress the gainful trespassing that the prevalent market-rent 
remedy anomalously encourages.  Second, the facilitation standard would 
help the disgorgement remedy function in a socially desirable way as the 
mirror image of perfect compensation.  Full compensation makes the victim 
indifferent between not having her right violated and receiving compensa-
tion for the right‘s violation.84  Correspondingly, full disgorgement makes 
the wrongdoer indifferent between not violating the victim‘s right and pay-
ing compensation for the right‘s violation.85  The facilitation standard would 
prompt prospective trespassers to respect the ownership rights of others.  
The adoption of a broad facilitation standard would effectively create a 
propertized disgorgement, the disgorgement analogue of our propertized 
compensation.  In fact, an example of propertized disgorgement exists in 
 
 
 
83
  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (Tentative Draft No. 
4, 2005).  This draft proposes to substantially expand the scope of disgorgement.  Under the proposed 
rule:  
(1) A person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass . . . is accountable to the victim of the 
wrong for the benefit so obtained. 
(2) The measure of recovery depends on the blameworthiness of the defendant‘s conduct.  As a 
general rule: 
(a) A conscious wrongdoer, or one who acts despite a known risk that the conduct in question vi-
olates the rights of the claimant, will be required to disgorge all gains (including consequential 
gains) derived from the wrongful transaction. 
(b) A person whose conduct is innocent or merely negligent will be liable only for the direct bene-
fit derived from the wrongful transaction.  Direct benefit may be measured, where such a mea-
surement is available and appropriate, by reasonable rental value or by the reasonable cost of a 
license. 
Id.  The proposed rule would thus establish the facilitation standard for intentional trespasses.  In cases 
of unintentional trespass, the strict causation requirement would continue to apply. 
84
  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 
561 (2006). 
85
  Id.; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 234 (3d ed. 2000) (coining 
the concept of ―perfect disgorgement‖ as the mirror image of perfect compensation); Robert Cooter & 
Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1991) (explaining that ―perfect disgorgement‖ is ―a sanction that re-
stores the wrongdoer to the same position that she would have been in but for the wrong‖ and thus 
―strips the agent of her gain from misappropriation and leaves her no better or worse than if she had 
done no wrong‖). 
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the law of California, which allows trespass victims to choose between ―the 
reasonable rental value‖ of the property ―for the time of that wrongful oc-
cupation‖ and ―the benefits obtained by the person wrongfully occupying 
the property by reason of that wrongful occupation.‖86  This provision rep-
laces the strict causation requirement with a broad standard reminiscent of 
our ―facilitation‖ criterion.  As one California court openly acknowledged, 
the disgorgement remedy in California was expanded because disgorge-
ment‘s underlying purpose—―‗to eliminate financial incentives for trespass 
by eradicating the benefit associated with the wrongful use of another‘s 
land‘‖—dictates that disgorgement capture any ―portion of the profit earned 
by the trespasser [that] was tied to the decision leading to the trespass.‖87  
This broad disgorgement can function as a suitable alternative remedy in 
cases in which courts cannot award propertized compensation. 
C. The Market-Rent Exception 
In this section, we identify special cases in which the owner should be 
denied propertized compensation and recover market-priced rent instead.  
As we have already noted, these cases are characterized by the trespasser‘s 
practical inability to negotiate the desired deal with the owner of the proper-
ty.88  If negotiating such a deal is impracticable or unduly costly, then, under 
certain conditions, a person should be allowed to trespass on another per-
son‘s land in exchange for market-priced rent.  This impracticality is a pri-
mary reason justifying the forced market-rent transaction between the tres-
trespasser and the owner.  Other conditions that legitimize this transaction 
constitute a tradeoff between costs and benefits.  Forcing the owner into this 
transaction is legitimate when the social benefit from the trespass exceeds 
the damage to the owner. 
In what follows, we examine three paradigmatic categories of these ex-
ceptional cases.  One of those categories is necessity: an act of trespass that 
averts greater harm.  Another category is media trespass: entry to a business 
property by an investigative reporter who poses as a patron, patient, or em-
ployee to surreptitiously monitor and document the business‘s activities.  
The third category is bona fide encroachment: trespasses committed in good 
faith involving construction across boundary lines. 
 
 
 
86
  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3334 (West 2009).  The owner is also entitled to ―the reasonable cost of 
repair or restoration of the property to its original condition, and the costs, if any, of recovering the pos-
session.‖  Id.  
87
  Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (quoting Watson Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).  Cali-
fornia law, however, exempts the trespasser from disgorgement upon a showing that his occupation of 
another‘s property originated from ―a mistake of fact.‖  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3334(b)(2) (West 2009).  The 
trespasser would then have to pay the owner ―the reasonable rental value of the property.‖  Id. 
88
  Cf. Merrill, supra note 23, at 25–26 (demonstrating how high transaction costs dictate the transi-
tion from a ―mechanical‖ to a ―judgmental‖ property right).  Both our and Merrill‘s accounts draw on 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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Before discussing these categories, we mention again the doctrine of de 
minimis that exempts trespassers from all liability for damages in appropri-
ate cases.89  Our rationale for the departure from the property rule regime 
explains the de minimis category as well.  In de minimis cases, negotiating 
the owner‘s permission for a trivial use of her property is either impractical 
or unreasonably expensive.  Moreover, the benefit produced by the trespass-
ing activity is much greater than the damage to the owner.90 
1. Trespass by Necessity.—The classic example of trespass by neces-
sity is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.91  In this case, a ship was 
moored to a private dock without permission from the dock owner in order 
to prevent it from being carried away by a storm.  While the unauthorized 
mooring salvaged the ship, it caused significant damage to the dock because 
the ship was repeatedly tossed against the dock by high waves.  The Minne-
sota Supreme Court decided that the actions of the captain of the ship were 
justified on grounds of necessity.  Yet the court ordered the ship owner to 
compensate the dock owner for the damage to the dock.92  The compensa-
tion award was based on the market price of the repairs.  The court cited 
with approval Ploof v. Putnam,93 a celebrated decision of the Vermont Su-
preme Court that denied a similarly situated dock owner the power to fend 
off trespass by unmooring the salvaged vessel and held him liable in tort for 
preventing the ship‘s rescue.94  
These and similar court decisions have developed a set of general rules 
that allow a person to enter and stay on another‘s property to the extent ne-
 
 
 
89
  See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 795 (Or. 1959) (attesting that ―there is a 
point where the entry is so lacking in substance that the law will refuse to recognize it, applying the 
maxim de minimis non curat lex,‖ and that ―it would seem clear that ordinarily the casting of a grain of 
sand upon another‘s land would not be a trespass‖); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (affirming constitutionality of state power to secure free speech at shopping malls by 
overriding the right to exclude, provided the owner suffers no material economic disadvantage). 
90
  Airplane overflights often fall into the de minimis category.  See Smith, Self Help, supra note 18, 
at 99 (noting that ―even in the case of real estate, the exclusion strategy does allow some invasions to 
count as de minimis‖ and mentioning airplane overflights as an example).  An overflight is technically a 
trespass because ―it involves an actual, direct, and visible entry into the column of space belonging to 
the surface owner.‖  Merrill, supra note 23, at 36.  In the most recurrent scenario, however, it causes no 
significant damage to the owner, who consequently cannot sue the airplane‘s operator.  Id.  The owner 
can sue the operator only when the flight interfered substantially with her use and enjoyment of the 
property.  See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2), at 281 (1965).  Air transportation is a so-
cially beneficial activity.  Air transportation providers are unable to negotiate overflights with landown-
ers at an affordable cost.  See Merrill, supra note 23, at 35–36.  These two factors mark overflights as an 
exceptional case in which the owner‘s compensation should be capped by market prices. 
91
  124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
92
  Id. at 222. 
93
  71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
94
  Id. at 189–90. 
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cessary to prevent serious and imminent harm.95  These rules have received 
near-unanimous approval from courts in all jurisdictions and are now deep-
ly entrenched in the law.96  The effect of these rules is to empower third par-
ties operating under conditions of necessity to impose market-priced 
transactions on property owners, while denying the latter the ability to undo 
the transaction.97  Courts have validated such transactions in a variety of 
cases involving the emergency rescue of people,98 animals,99 and chattels.100  
We believe that the exceptional treatment of necessity cases under 
trespass doctrine is justified.  In cases of necessity, the parties cannot be ex-
pected to negotiate a voluntary transaction ex ante.  Facing an emergency 
that requires swift action, the rescuer has no time to reach out to the proper-
ty owner in order to determine her subjective reserve price.  The rescuer 
must therefore conduct a quick cost–benefit analysis based on the informa-
tion available to him.  He is well situated to assess the benefit he stands to 
 
 
 
95
  See, e.g., Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 15634(b) (West 2009) (exempting from civil liability caregivers of an elder or a dependent adult who 
allow law enforcement agents investigating a report of the elder‘s or the dependant‘s abuse to enter pri-
vate premises without the owner‘s consent); Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 322 n.7, 
323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (construing § 15634(b) broadly as analogous to the general doctrine of necessi-
ty and affirming grant of demurrer in a trespass action against paramedics and sheriffs who forcibly en-
tered residence after receiving report of suspected elder abuse); Rossi v. Del Duca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 
593–94 (Mass. 1962) (same); see also Trisuzzi v. Tabatchnik, 666 A.2d 543, 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1995) (affirming applicability of the necessity defense in trespass cases on the ground that ―‗[t]he 
cry of distress is the summons to relief‘‖ (quoting Wagner v. Int‘l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 
1921) (Cardozo, J.))).  
96
  These rules are incorporated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, at 355 (1965), which 
provides that: 
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or reasonably 
appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to: 
(a) the actor, or his land or chattels, or 
(b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, unless the actor knows or has reason 
to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such action. 
(2) Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, he is subject to liability for any 
harm done in the exercise of the privilege stated in Subsection (1) to any legally protected interest 
of the possessor in the land or connected with it, except where the threat of harm to avert which 
the entry is made is caused by the tortious conduct or contributory negligence of the possessor. 
97
  But the owner can often resist the transaction‘s initial imposition.  When a person visits her cabin 
in the woods and finds the proverbial backpacker eating her food to avoid death from starvation, she 
cannot forcibly remove the food from the backpacker‘s mouth.  Upon a more timely arrival, however, 
she is permitted by the law to deny the starving backpacker access to the cabin and block his entry by 
using reasonable force. 
98
  See cases cited supra notes 91–95.  
99
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(1), at 355, & illus. 12, at 360. 
100
  Id.  See also John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property 
Rights, 83 N.D. L. REV. 651 (2007) (examining caselaw pertaining to the necessity doctrine and identi-
fying uncertainty as to whether the aggrieved property owner is entitled to recover compensation from a 
person acting under emergency conditions to protect a societal, rather than private, interest). 
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gain from the rescue mission.  As for the cost, the only data on which he 
can base his decision are market prices.   
Given the unusual circumstances and the unique position of the res-
cuer, it makes sense for society to entrust the decision whether to commit 
trespass to the rescuer but force him to internalize the amount generally an-
ticipated to be the cost of his act—namely, the market price of the use.  If 
the rescuer and the property owner could set up a fast, cheap, and sincere 
negotiation channel, they would form and carry out a mutually beneficial 
rescue agreement voluntarily.  Unfortunately, no one has yet established 
such a channel for emergency situations.  Furthermore, the owner may try 
to take advantage of the situation and bargain strategically in order to in-
crease his surplus.101   
These obstacles are likely to foil the rescue effort and what otherwise 
could have been a welfare-improving agreement.  Since the market price re-
flects the average asking price of property owners, in many cases the owner 
of the trespassed property will suffer no real loss from receiving the market 
price.102  Only owners who place a subjective value premium on their prop-
erty103 will be undercompensated by this arrangement.  Given that necessity 
cases are rather rare, and assuming that the number of owners who value 
their properties above market rate is relatively small, it is unlikely that the 
liability rule protection in necessity cases will occasion a real harm to prop-
erty owners, let alone undermine the entire ownership regime. 
2. Media Trespass.—A second category of cases in which propertiz- 
ed compensation should be withheld involves trespass by media reporters.  
To uncover a dishonest and harmful activity of a business enterprise, media 
reporters must often gain entry to the enterprise‘s property by using a fabri-
cated identity.  Reporters employ a myriad of tactics to gain access to sensi-
tive business information, including applying for employment with a firm 
or pretending to be a patron, client, or patient.  Once entry has been secured, 
the reporter monitors the enterprise‘s suspicious activities and documents 
them in photos as well as in audio or video recordings.  Using such tech-
niques, journalists have uncovered and reported cases of degrading treat-
 
 
 
101
  See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ro-
nald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 577 (1993) (attesting that under the circumstances of necessity ―the 
bargaining range is so large that there is some risk that no deal will be struck as each side campaigns for 
the larger fraction of the contested domain‖).  Note that if the owner manages to impose on the rescuer a 
contractual obligation to pay her a downright exploitative amount, she might be unable to recover it.  
See Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts in the Shadow of No Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 315, 324–37 (2008) (identifying legal exits from distress exploitation agreements). 
102
  However, this will not be the case when there is significant variance in asking prices. 
103
  Cf. David Genesove & Christopher Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from 
the Housing Market, 116 QUART. J. ECON. 1233, 1235 (2001) (observing systematic refusal of home-
owners to lower their asking prices during market downturns and explaining it by loss aversion). 
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ment of elderly residents by a nursing home,104 repackaging of unsanitary 
meat and fish by a grocery chain,105 unnecessary cataract operations per-
formed by an eye clinic,106 and other wrongdoings.107   
What are the consequences of this modus operandi under the law of 
trespass?  This question received Judge Richard Posner‘s detailed consider-
ation in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies,108 an appeal by an 
eye clinic of the trial court‘s dismissal of its trespass action against ABC.  
The action alleged that reporters working for ABC gained access to the clin-
ic‘s facilities by posing as patients to prepare footage documenting the clin-
ic‘s fraudulent practices.109  ABC‘s footage revealed that the clinic‘s 
ophthalmic surgeons convinced elderly Medicaid patients to undergo unne-
cessary operations.110  
Judge Posner began his analysis by stating three legal axioms.  First, 
―[t]o enter upon another‘s land without consent is a trespass.‖111  Second, 
―there is no journalists‘ privilege to trespass.‖112  Third, ―there can be no 
implied consent . . . when express consent is procured by a misrepresenta-
tion.‖113  Posner then identified ―a surprising result‖114 at which courts have 
arrived in adjudicating an owner‘s consent to an imposter‘s entry: the im-
poster‘s fraud vitiates the owner‘s consent in some cases but not in others.115  
Cases in which the owner‘s consent was vitiated include those where a 
homeowner ―opens his door to a purported meter reader who is in fact noth-
ing of the sort—just a busybody curious about the interior of the home‖116 
and where a corporate spy poses as a customer to gain entry to a rival firm‘s 
premises in order to steal its trade secrets.117  Cases in which the owner‘s in-
itial consent remains valid include those where a restaurant critic eats in a 
restaurant under a borrowed identity, a browser in a store pretends to be in-
 
 
 
104
  See James A. Albert, The Liability of the Press for Trespass and Invasion of Privacy in Gather-
ing the News—A Call for the Recognition of a Newsgathering Tort Privilege, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
331, 333 (2002) (citing Nancy Stancill, Deadly Neglect: Texas and Its Nursing Homes, HOUSTON 
CHRON., July 22–26, 1990, at A1). 
105
  See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). 
106
  See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995). 
107
  See Albert, supra note 104, at 334 (attesting that investigative reporters broke ―several major 
stories‖ by resorting to trespass). 
108
  44 F.3d 1345, 1351–53 (7th Cir. 1995). 
109
  Id. at 1348. 
110
  Id.  
111
  Id. at 1351. 
112
  Id. 
113
  Id. 
114
  Id. 
115
  See id. at 1351–52. 
116
  Id. at 1352 (citing State v. Donahue, 762 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Bouillon v. Lac-
lede Gaslight Co., 129 S.W. 401, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910)). 
117
  Id. (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991); 
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1854 
terested in merchandise he cannot afford to buy, a customer in a car dealer-
ship‘s showroom bargains down a salesperson by falsely claiming to be of-
fered a cheaper car price by another vendor, and a guest fakes friendship 
with the host just in order to eat dinner at his home.118 
Judge Posner identified a principle by which to distinguish between 
these two classes of cases.119  The proposed principle is based on the nature 
of the wrongdoing to which the property owner would object in each case.  
In the ―meter reader‖ case, for example, the owner would object to the un-
wanted person‘s physical presence on her property.  Because trespass law is 
designed to fend off unwanted intruders, the owner‘s consent is vitiated.  In 
the dealership case, by contrast, the owner would not mind and might even 
welcome the customer‘s presence on her property.  All she would object to 
is the fraud, but fraud is not what trespass law protects people against.  The 
owner‘s consent therefore constitutes a good defense against trespass alle-
gations in this class of cases.120  Posner acknowledges that this distinction is 
untidy, but in his opinion, it is sufficiently viable to do the work.121  
Based on this distinction, Judge Posner (writing for the Seventh Cir-
cuit) affirmed the lower court‘s decision to dismiss the clinic‘s allegations 
of trespass.122  These allegations, he explained, pointed to ―no inva-
sion . . . of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to pro-
tect,‖ as ―[t]he test patients entered offices that were open to anyone 
expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped physicians en-
gaged in professional, not personal, communications with strangers (the tes-
ters themselves).‖123  
This ruling and its rationalization were subsequently adopted by the 
Fourth Circuit in a decision that upheld a nominal $2 award for media tres-
passes perpetrated by ABC and its affiliates against the Food Lion grocery 
chain.124  In that case, reporters uncovered and videotaped food fraud125 by 
taking advantage of their employee positions at Food Lion, which they pre-
viously obtained with the help of fake identities.126  The Fourth Circuit de-
cided that, under the applicable laws of both North Carolina and South 
Carolina, gaining entry to a firm‘s premises after securing a job with it 
through application misrepresentation does not constitute trespass.127  The 
 
 
 
118
  Id. at 1351. 
119
  See id. at 1352. 
120
  Id. 
121
  See id. (―The lines are not bright . . . .  They are the traces of the old forms of action, which have 
resulted in a multitude of artificial distinctions in modern law.  But that is nothing new.‖).  
122
  Id. 
123
  Id. 
124
  See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 517–18 (4th Cir. 1999). 
125
  Allegedly, this fraud included mixing out-of-date beef with new beef, bleaching smelly meat to 
remove its odor, and re-dating products not sold before their printed expiration dates.  Id. at 510. 
126
  Id. 
127
  Id. at 518. 
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court, however, also took notice of the fact that the laws of both jurisdic-
tions require an employee to be loyal to her or his employer.  Based on this 
separate loyalty obligation, the court held that the reporters‘ unauthorized 
filming of Food Lion‘s nonpublic areas had exceeded their authority to en-
ter its premises as employees and therefore amounted to trespass.128 
This approach to media trespass is predicated on a misguided view of 
the owner‘s right to exclude others from her property.  The right to exclude 
entitles the owner not only to block another person‘s entry to her property 
entirely but also to grant her conditional entry.  The owner can set countless 
conditions for another person‘s entry to her property, as well as notify any 
entrant, expressly or implicitly, that violation of any of those conditions 
would make him an unwanted trespasser.129  This power of the property 
owner is at odds with the line drawn by Judge Posner in his attempt to es-
tablish a principled distinction between different entry-by-fraud scenarios.  
Differentiating between wanted and unwanted entrants is the owner‘s 
prerogative; the court‘s task is limited to ascertaining how she exercised 
that prerogative as a matter of fact.  The dishonest customer in the dealer-
ship may therefore be as unwanted from an owner‘s perspective as the un-
invited ―meter reader.‖  The restaurant critic, Judge Posner‘s prime example 
of a nontrespasser,130 would become a trespasser if she broke the owner‘s 
rule that a patron is entitled to be served only if she made a reservation un-
der her real name.  Consider, finally, the Fourth Circuit‘s holding in Food 
Lion that application fraud does not turn a licensee into a trespasser.131  This 
holding, too, is contingent upon specific facts.  The court might not make 
the same decision after learning that the employer notified prospective em-
ployees that their authorization to enter the premises was conditioned upon 
providing full and accurate information about themselves.  
We offer a framework which offers a more promising approach to cas-
es of media trespass.  Instead of stipulating without proof that owners 
would willingly give up their right to exclude, we propose that such cases 
be dealt with by substituting market value compensation for propertized 
compensation.  Three reasons combine to justify this policy.  First, and 
most importantly, it is unlikely that any voluntary negotiations will yield an 
 
 
 
128
  Id. at 518–19.  The appropriateness of the jury‘s $2 damages award for this trespass was not liti-
gated in this appeal and the court consequently did not address the matter, though it did dismiss all puni-
tive damages as they were only awarded for the fraud claim, which the court reversed.  Id. at 522. 
129
  An atheist entering a church open to all prayers does not commit trespass.  Yet he would commit 
trespass if he subsequently whispers blasphemy (even when no one else can hear it).  What, if any, re-
medies would be available to the church in such a case is a separate question.  For the possibility of re-
covering punitive damages, see infra notes 142–152 and accompanying text.  Business owners, however, 
cannot set conditions that create racial discrimination.  See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding prohibitions against racial discrimination by hotels); see also 
Singer, supra note 1, at 1286–98, 1303–1412. 
130
  See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995). 
131
  See 194 F.3d at 518. 
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agreement in those cases.  Property owners are not likely to give reporters 
permission to uncover socially untoward practices conducted on the proper-
ty.  Indeed, the desire to conceal those practices from the public likely 
prompted the owner to conduct them on private property in the first place.  
Parodies in copyright law provide a useful analogy.  Parodists enjoy a privi-
leged status for purposes of fair use analysis because we do not expect cop-
yright owners to sanction parodying of their work.132  Indeed, if parodists 
were required to negotiate an agreement prior to engaging in their craft, pa-
rodies would lose much of their bite.  The same logic applies to media re-
porters seeking to criticize the behavior of property owners.  
Second, and relatedly, investigative journalism is a socially beneficial 
activity.  The public has an interest in learning about hazardous, fraudulent, 
and unsanitary business practices.  Media reports of such practices generate 
value for the public at large.  Yet because information becomes public upon 
its release, media outlets cannot capture the full value of their reports to the 
public.  Once information is disclosed to the public, spillovers become in-
evitable because news agencies cannot restrict access only to paying users.  
Given this fact, if the law were to impose on media companies the full cost 
of investigative journalism, they might decide to give up the practice, which 
would compromise the information market and deprive the public of impor-
tant information. 
Third, and finally, the harm to the property interest of the owner in 
media trespass cases is typically small.  The property harm should be dis-
tinguished from the overall harm.  The overall harm occasioned by reporters 
on business enterprises may be quite dramatic.  When a socially harmful 
practice comes to light, the business that adopted it suffers reputational 
damage and other repercussions.  Yet those consequences to the business 
stem from the disclosure, not from the violation of the right to exclude.133 
Consider Desnick and other paradigmatic examples of media trespass.  
In each of these cases, the harm suffered by the owner from the trespass it-
self was relatively insignificant.  What was significant was the damage to 
the owner‘s reputation and privacy, but property law—and the trespass doc-
trine in particular—is not designed to protect people against such damage.  
Furthermore, the concept of ownership does not imply a broad (let alone 
 
 
 
132
  As the Supreme Court has stated: 
This distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is 
reflected in the rule that there is no protectible derivative market for criticism.  The market for po-
tential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop 
or license others to develop.  Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license 
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a 
potential licensing market.  ―People ask . . . for criticism, but they only want praise.‖ 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (quoting WILLIAM SOMERSET 
MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 241 (Penguin 1992)). 
133
  Moreover, the business has only itself to blame.  Businesses that adopt fraudulent or unsafe prac-
tices should bear the consequences of their decisions rather than shelter themselves behind the right to 
exclude. 
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absolute) right to suppress information from the public.  Based on the 
aforementioned reasons, we conclude that, as a general rule, compensation 
for media trespass should be based upon market prices—which in many 
cases may be a negligible amount, or even zero.134 
3. Bona Fide Encroachments.—A final exception we wish to recogn- 
ize concerns good faith encroachments.  An encroachment occurs when a 
structure intrudes the space of a neighboring lot.135  Real world examples of 
encroachments involve fences or structures that project into the surface of 
adjacent properties, foundations and sewage systems that protrude into 
neighboring ground, and balconies and staircases that invade the airspace of 
adjoining tracts.   
In the past, courts tended to treat encroachments—even those commit-
ted in good faith—like other instances of trespass.136  The encroached-upon 
owner was entitled to injunctive relief and could seek removal of the intrud-
ing element regardless of the size of the encroachment or the hardship to the 
encroacher.  The classic case of Pile v. Pedrick137 illustrates the traditional 
approach.  Pedrick, owing to a district surveyor‘s mistake, built a factory 
whose wall encroached one and three-eighths inches into Pile‘s property.138  
Pile sued for trespass and sought removal of the projecting part.  The court 
rejected Pedrick‘s request to order damages in this case and instead ordered 
Pedrick to either pay Pile any amount Pile named to keep the wall in place 
or tear down the wall.139  
Although some states still adhere to the strict traditional view, many 
others have departed from it by enacting statutes that recognize an excep-
tion for ―good faith improvers‖—i.e., encroachers who inadvertently built 
 
 
 
134
  This recommendation may be at odds with some of our readers‘ intuitions about the ―meter 
reader‖ and ―corporate spy‖ cases.  Arguably, both the meter reader and the corporate spy should pay 
their victims more than just a nominal compensation.  We tend to agree with this argument: in our opi-
nion, both defendants should pay their victims punitive damages.  The reason they should pay those 
damages, however, has nothing to do with their proprietary infractions and everything to do with their 
general disrespect for the law.  This remedy, as we explain in this Essay, is not the same as propertized 
compensation.  See infra Part III.  
135
  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 40 (2d ed. 2005).  An encroachment 
may also occur when vegetation and tree parts invade the space of neighboring lots.  In such cases, how-
ever, the rules and remedies are different.  Most importantly, in such cases, the encroached-upon owner 
is entitled to use self-help to remove the projecting branches, hedges, and roots.  Id. at 42. 
136
  See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for 
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 134 (1993) (―Under the common law of the ear-
ly nineteenth century, a nonowner who, in good faith or otherwise, entered, possessed, and improved 
real property was generally not entitled to the value of those improvements if they were ‗permanently 
affixed to real estate.‘‖ (quoting Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. 
REV. 37, 38 (1985))). 
137
  31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895). 
138
  Id. at 647. 
139
  Id.  The court gave Pedrick one year to comply with its order.  Id. 
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on their neighbors‘ land.140  Good faith improver statutes mitigate the harsh 
consequences of the traditional approach by empowering courts to deny in-
junctive relief to encroached-upon owners when the encroacher acted in 
good faith.  Instead, these statutes permit courts to give the encroached-
upon owner a choice between buying the encroaching structure and selling 
the property on which the structure was erected to the encroacher.  Essen-
tially, such statutes confer upon the aggrieved property owner the choice 
between a call option (buying the structure) and a put option (selling the 
land).141 
Good faith improver statutes often require encroachers to prove not on-
ly that they acted in good faith but also that they acted in a non-negligent 
manner.  The case of Raab v. Casper142 exemplifies the importance of the 
latter requirement.  In Raab, the encroacher was denied ―good faith improv-
er‖ status under the California statute because he ignored the encroached-
upon owner‘s warnings regarding the proper location of the boundary line 
between the lots and chose to continue with the construction project.143  To 
claim good faith improver status, a defendant cannot engage in willful 
blindness and must inquire about the precise location of her lot‘s boundary 
lines. 
We believe that good faith improvers who acted in a non-negligent 
manner should pay market-value compensation.  Non-negligent good faith 
improvers did not attempt to circumvent the market.  Nor did they try to 
compromise the integrity of their neighbors‘ property rights.  Since good 
faith improvers will never seek permission from neighboring property own-
ers, as they believe they are acting on their own properties, there is no for-
gone transaction here for the surrounding owners.  Moreover, given that 
good faith improvers did not act negligently, forcing them to pay proper-
tized compensation would lead them to expend excessive resources on ac-
quisition and verification of information concerning boundary lines.144 
 
 
 
140
  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.1–.7 (West 2009(. 
141
  See Ayres, supra note 5, at 814–16. 
142
  124 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
143
  Id. at 594–95. 
144
  See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1313–14 (2008).  As Professor Sterk explains, applications of the negligence 
standard are bound to be fact-intensive and vary from case to case.  Id. at 1314.  See also id. at 1322 
(―[W]hen the stakes increase, failure to search becomes less reasonable and more negligent.‖).  The 
prospect of recovering market-price compensation for innocent encroachments will also set the right 
―marking off‖ incentive for property owners.  An owner will mark off her property (e.g., by surveying 
its boundaries and fencing them off) only when the difference between her and the market‘s valuation of 
the property exceeds the cost of marking off.  Id. at 1314–15.  For another rationalization of the rule that 
imposes market-price compensation on bona fide encroachers, see Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: 
The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1066 (2006) (―Once the struc-
ture is in place, a bilateral monopoly exists that may prevent the efficient result from obtaining through 
consensual market transactions.‖). 
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
As we have already noted, punitive damages may be awarded in tres-
pass cases, yet courts rarely use them.145  Imposing punitive damages on 
trespassers has the potential to fend off trespass as efficaciously as injunc-
tions.  Noting this point, Professor Henry E. Smith commended the use of 
punitive damages against trespass.146  Nonetheless, there are weighty rea-
sons not to turn punitive damages into the remedy of choice in trespass cas-
es.  At any rate, punitive damages should not be favored over propertized 
compensation and disgorgement.  Punitive damages are a highly imprecise 
policy tool that would nearly always miss the mark as a remedy seeking to 
reinstate, ex post, the owner‘s right to exclude.  As an ex ante remedy, on 
the other hand, punitive damages—given the current conditions under 
which they can be imposed—would systematically underdeter trespass.  
The implementation of a punitive damage regime critically depends on 
the courts.  In order to operationalize such a regime, it is necessary to en-
trust the courts with the power to grant supracompensatory awards.  Be-
cause courts can easily abuse this power,147 their power to award punitive 
damages must be limited in a principled way that satisfies the demands of 
due process.148  Indeed, the Supreme Court has imposed a number of limita-
tions on courts‘ ability to use this type of remedy.149  Specifically, the Court 
has provided that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of punitive damages that are grossly excessive or 
arbitrary.150  The Court also has held that the amount of punitive damages 
must reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct151 and has im-
 
 
 
145
  See supra note 41 and cases cited therein; Gallegos v. Lloyd, 178 P.3d 922, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 
2008) (―‗[B]efore punitive damages may be awarded [in a trespass case], the plaintiff must prove con-
duct that is willful and malicious, or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard 
toward the rights of others.‘‖ (quoting Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1987))); 
Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc‘ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 642 (Tenn. 1996) (opining that punitive dam-
ages are available in ―the rare, appropriate trespass case‖ and that ―[c]oncomitant with the . . . right to 
sue for trespass is the corresponding remedy which may in unusual, unique cases include punitive dam-
ages‖); Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 916 P.2d 1264, 
1274 (Idaho 1996) (approving trial court‘s refusal to impose punitive damages for trespass because ―pu-
nitive damages are not favored by the law and should be awarded . . . only in the most unusual and com-
pelling circumstances,‖ such as ―in a trespass action when the defendant acted in a manner which was 
outrageous, unfounded, unreasonable, and in conscious disregard of the plaintiff‘s property rights‖). 
146
  See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 17, at 1723, 1732–33 (rationalizing the imposition of pu-
nitive damages for trespass as part of the preferred property rule protection of ownership).  
147
  See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–65 (1996) (documenting an Ala-
bama court‘s award of punitive damages in the amount of $4 million to a local doctor who purchased a 
new BMW sports sedan without being told that it was repainted after damage presumed to be caused by 
acid rain). 
148
  See id. at 574–86 (voiding a punitive damage award for being excessive and determining guide-
posts for assessing punitive damages under the Due Process Clause). 
149
  See id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18 (2003). 
150
  See Gore, 517 U.S. at 575–86. 
151
  Id. at 575. 
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posed further limitations on the courts‘ power to award such damages.152  
Those limitations include the ―single-digit ratio‖ guideline that deems un-
constitutional virtually any award of punitive damages that exceeds the 
plaintiff‘s compensatory damage award by ten times or more.153  The Court 
has exempted from this requirement cases in which the compensatory dam-
age award is very small.154  But since cases that qualify for the exemption 
rarely involve reprehensible infliction of harm that calls for the imposition 
of punitive damages in the first place, the exemption is not very meaningful 
in practice. 
Ex post, therefore, punitive damages may fail to protect the property 
owner‘s interests in a systematic and dependable way.  Due to the reprehen-
sibility condition, punitive damages cannot be awarded in standard trespass 
cases.  As far as the owner‘s remediation is concerned, punitive damages 
will almost always be either excessive or insufficient.  Jacque155 is, in all li-
kelihood, an example of excessive remediation.  The award of $100,000 to 
the plaintiffs for a single unwanted crossing of their unoccupied land was 
probably above any conceivable price that they would have agreed to 
charge in a voluntary transaction.156  On the other hand, cases featuring con-
tinuous, though not reprehensible, trespass provide examples of insufficient 
remediation.  More generally, when the punitive element is insufficiently 
high, compensation awarded to the aggrieved property owner may fall short 
of her ex ante asking price.  Conversely, when the punitive element is too 
high, the owner will be overcompensated.  At first glance, overcompensa-
tion may not strike readers as a problem, but if we broaden our perspective 
and add third parties to the analysis, it becomes apparent that overcompen-
sation of the owner is often socially undesirable as well.  
This point marks the beginning of our assessment of the ex ante effects 
that punitive damages may have.  This assessment focuses on the incentive 
to trespass.  Under the current law, this incentive crucially depends on 
whether the court will perceive the trespass as reprehensible or egregious.  
For trespasses falling into this category, a court is likely to award punitive 
damages, and the amount of those damages will depend on how reprehensi-
ble the trespass was.  A garden variety trespass, on the other hand, is highly 
 
 
 
152
  Id. at 575–86. 
153
  Id. at 581–83 (noting that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and com-
pensatory damages satisfy due process); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
154
  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
155
  563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
156
  We are aware that the Jacques had actually refused to accept money in exchange for allowing the 
defendant to move its mobile home through their territory.  See id. at 157.  We still believe that there 
must have been a sum high enough to persuade them to give the requested permission.  Cf. Keith N. 
Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 446 (1998) (ar-
guing that the punitive award in Jacque ―is quite defensible on economic grounds‖). 
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unlikely to lead to a punitive damage award.157  The threat of punitive dam-
ages thus deters only egregious trespassers.  Regular trespassers, on the oth-
er hand, are generally exempt from punitive damages.  The punitive damage 
doctrine, therefore, clearly fails to deter this very large category of trespass-
ers.  
The doctrine needs to be reformed so as to create a meaningful threat 
for all trespassers.  Such a reform, however, would create a problem of its 
own.  Because punitive damages are a highly imprecise policy tool, their 
amount is bound to be excessive in some cases and insufficient in others.  
When punitive damages are too high, they restore respect for the property 
rights of owners but at the cost of overdeterrence.  Overdeterrence here 
means that third parties will fear to take any liberty with other people‘s 
property even in cases where doing so cannot be considered reprehensible 
and is, in fact, socially desirable.  These cases, admittedly, are quite rare, 
but there is no reason to discount them completely. 
Consider the following example.  Tina runs a successful orthopedic 
clinic on Owen‘s property.  Her five-year lease contract with Owen is about 
to expire.  Tina, however, has a right of first refusal under the contract.  
Owen notifies Tina that Rick has offered him $300,000 in annual rent.  Tina 
currently pays Owen $100,000, and her realtor tells her that even this 
amount is far above the market price for similar properties.  Tina calls 
Owen to tell him that Rick‘s offer is a sham and accuses Owen of attempt-
ing to circumvent her right of first refusal.  Owen feels offended and hangs 
up.  The next day, he receives a letter from Tina‘s lawyer notifying him that 
she is exercising her option to rent the property for another five years and 
that, in the absence of competing offers, the annual rent will continue to be 
$100,000.  Owen files a court action, but it takes him twelve months to win 
the case and evict Tina.  During this period, Tina pays him $100,000, and 
he accepts those payments ―under protest and without prejudice.‖  
After hearing the parties‘ evidence, the court makes a factual determi-
nation that Rick‘s offer was real.  The court also determines that Tina had a 
sincere—albeit not completely reasonable—belief, formed upon her attor-
ney‘s advice, that it was within her rights to stay as a tenant on Owen‘s 
property for five additional years while paying him an annual rent of 
$100,000.  The court ultimately decides that Tina occupied Owen‘s proper-
ty as a trespasser and holds that she should now pay Owen punitive damag-
es in the amount of $500,000.  Tina‘s total payment to Owen for the twelve 
additional months of occupation thus equals $600,000.  
 
 
 
157
  See supra note 145 and cases cited therein; see also Patterson v. Holleman, 917 So. 2d 125, 135 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (approving a trial court‘s refusal to award punitive damages because ―‗[i]n the 
case of a trespass, punitive damages may be awarded if the proof shows that the trespass was willful, 
grossly negligent or wanton‘‖ (quoting Teasley v. Buford, 876 So. 2d 1070, 1078 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2004))). 
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Under our approach, Tina must pay Owen propertized compensation in 
the amount of $200,000, the difference between her payment for the twelve 
months of trespass and the rental sum offered by Rick.  Her total payment 
to Owen would thus equal $300,000.  This amount creates optimal deter-
rence.  Anticipation of a $300,000 payment induces a person to consider her 
annual gain from the trespass, as well as the owner‘s loss.  If that gain is be-
low $300,000, the potential trespasser will not trespass.  If the gain exceeds 
$300,000, she will use the land.  Each of those actions enhances social wel-
fare relative to its alternative.  Under the punitive damage rule, in contrast, 
Tina‘s $600,000 payout would deter a similarly situated person from con-
tinuing her occupation of a leased property when she stands to earn between 
$300,000 and $600,000 from doing so.  This outcome is socially undesira-
ble. 
CONCLUSION 
The maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a re-
medy) is a fundamental tenet of our legal system.  Yet it only captures part 
of the complex relationship between rights and remedies.  Specifically, it 
fails to acknowledge that the nature and scope of a legal right are defined by 
the restorative consequence of the remedy.  In this Essay, we have demon-
strated the significance of this omission by focusing on the protection of 
owners‘ right to exclude.  The decision to entitle property owners to mar-
ket-value compensation against trespassers is antithetical to the very idea of 
ownership.  To fix this problem, we have introduced a new remedial con-
cept—propertized compensation—and accompanied it with the evidentiary 
mechanism necessary for its implementation by the courts.  We have also 
proposed a reform to the disgorgement doctrine that would turn it into a 
suitable alternative to propertized compensation.  Finally, we have identi-
fied special cases in which trespass victims should receive only market-
value compensation.  We then showed how trespass law should be reorga-
nized in light of those insights.  Our core insight extends well beyond tres-
pass, however.  Lawmakers should identify and rectify other discrepancies 
between rights and remedies.  The evidentiary mechanism developed in this 
Essay should aid them in this task. 
 
 
